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• Every rul2f makes enemies. [There are no exceotlons.] ... If one chooses sides on emotion, then the Rebel is the gUY to go wi tho He IS fighting for everything men claim to honor: 
freedom, indeoendence, truth, the right ... all 
the subjective illusions, all the eternal 
trigger-words • .•• 
There are no self-oroclaimed villains only 
regiments of self-oroclaimed saints. Victorious 
historians rule where good or evil 1ies. 
-- Glen Cook, The Black Company 
• 
The Bolsheviks did not have a monopoly on revolution nor were they 
the predominant force during the February Revolutior, in 1917. The 
Bolsheviks reoresented on!>'a small, though important, pol i tical grouD 
of the ultra-extreme left. On the left they were rivalled by another 
politic.al group, often over-looKed and forgotten, the anarchists. The 
anar-chists were the ultra-left of the pop'Jlist political tradition, 
while the BolsheviKs were the ultra-left of the Social Democratic or 
Marxist Doliti,:al tradition. The anarchists played an important role in 
Russian radical pol itics- in the mid-19th century long before ~Iarxism 
became a viable ideology in Russia. The anarchists trace their 
ideological origins bacK to the Russian emigres BaKunin and Kropotkin 
and to the Frenchman Proudhon. The anarchists have always been a 
relatively small group but theY have exerted gr-eat influence in 
prooortion to their numbers. The February Revolution was not a 
BolsheviK one and the October coup d'etat was not a Durell' Bolshevik 
affair either. In fact virtuallY- all of the extreme lefti-st Darties, 
Left Social Revolutionaries (SRs), MensheviKs, and anarchists, were 
• eager to be rid of KerensKy and his Provisional Government. 
• The anarchists were strongest in Petrograd and its surrounding territory and in the Ukraine. In each of these centers of influence the 
anarchists h9.ve their own story to tell that is in many ways different 
from the Bolshevik oerspective on the same events. Ir, particular, two 
events are often cited as being in some way purely anarchist: The 
activi ties of Nestor Makhno in the Ukraine and trle Kronstadt Rebellion 
of 1921. While Makhno is often brushed aside and forgotten by everyone 
except the anarchist·s, the Kronstadt J;:ebell ion remains a hotly disouted 
event by all sides of the pol i tical spectrum. In 1921 the defeated 
adversaries of the Bolsheviks were all quick to declare the rebellion to 
be theirs by inspiration, the supposed Third Revolution. Who were the 
anarchists and what role did they 010.)' in regard to Kronstadt? What 
happened at Kronstadt that makes the event so important? Who really was 
• responsible for the rebel 1 ion? What is the anarchist perspective a.nd how did it differ from the Bolshevik's? These are the questions that 
will be answered in the following pages. 
To begin, one needs to understand the setting. Geography and 
various demograohic factors are important to the understanding of the 
Kr'onstadt incident. Kronstadt is a city situated on the 12 X 3 
kilometer Kotl in Island in the Finni'sh Gulf, 30 kilometers west of 
Petro·;wad. It is the principal base of the Baltic Fleet. Kotl in Island 
is strewn with fortifications and artillery batteries. The docks are on 
the east side, in the city, closest to Petrograd. The island is 
surrounded by forts and batteries all around the bay to the north and 
south. Krasnaia Gorka is 20 kilometers to the southwest. Lissy Noss is 
• 
10 kilometers to the north. Kronstadt, the bay forts, and numerous 
small fortresss in the bay were all carefully designed to defend 
• Petr-ograd; Kr-onstadt was to be the center-oiece. (Vol ine, 441) The fortifications were formidable. 
The city of Kr-onstadt was an industr-ial naval town of about 82,000. 
This figur-e consists of about 20,000 soldier-s, 12,000 sailor-s, and 
50,000 civil ians most of whom wer-e factor-Y wor-ker-s. By 1921, after-
numerous detachments had been sent to fight the civil war-, the 
pooulation fell to ar-ound 50,000, while the composition did not change 
significantly. Ther-e wer-e ar-ound 27,000 sailor-s and soldier-s at the 
time of the 1921 uor-ising. The natur-e of this for-ce is unique to the 
Russian mil itar-y. The needs of the moder-n Russian navy under the Tsar 
r-equir-ed a I iter-ate and ver-y skilled sailor-. Hence, about 84% wer·e 
I iter-ate and most wer-e recr-uited fr-om the wor-king class. Three of four 
s.ai lor-s came for-m the urban pr·oletar·iat, which was qui te the opposi te of 
• the pr-edominent peasant backgr-ound of the r-egular- soldier- in the ar-my. The ar-my of 1917 only dr-ew about 3% of its r-ecr-uits fr-om industr-ial 
backgr-ounds. (Getzler- 7,10,205) By 1921, tr,e composition of Kr-onstadt 
changed to a more pronounced peasant backgr-ound and dr-awn fr-om the 
Ukr-aine and the Baltics. 
The situation throughout Russia in late 1920 and ear-ly 1921 was one 
of desper-ation for the peoole. The Civil War- was winding down. The 
gr-eat White ar-mies and for-eign inter-ventionists had been lar-gely 
defeated. The countr-y was on the edge of economic collapse, shortage of 
all goods wer-e r-ampant. Star-vation lur-ked ar-ound all cor-ner-s. Dur-ing 
1920 Russia suffered a sever-e dr-ought and the winter pr-oved to be 
especially har-sh. SPor-adic peasant upr-isings were erupting allover 
• 
Russia, especially in the Ukr-aine, the Tambov r-egion and Siber-ia, wher-e 
the upr-isings and subsequent supr-essions wer-e often br-utal. (Avrich. 
• 13-16) The peasants were rising against a BolsheviK pol icy known as War Communism. The BolsheviKs had a standing pol icy of forced 
requisitioning which was pr'acticed with vast local abuse. Despite the 
fact that civil war was winding down, the BolsheviKs did not feel 
themselv~s to be in a secure position! since civil war could easily 
start again and might turn the oeasant masses against the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. In starK contrast to the rest of Russia and 
Petrograd, tl~o observers, Ieronymos YasinsKy, a party lecturer, and 
Skoromnyi, a sailor, recalled that Kronstadt was prosperous and in good 
order in the fall of 1920. (Getzler, 208) 
The striKes in Petrograd during February were just one of many 
causes that insoired the Kronstadt Rebell ion. The bitter discontent of 
the ·;·ailors against the BolsheviKs began in the summer of 1920. In June 
• TrotsKy aooointed Fioder RasKolniKov as Commander of the Baltic Fleet with the purpose of restoring the integrity of the fleet. The 
aopointment itself was controversial in the sense that the BolsheviKs 
imposed their authority over the Kronstadt Soviet by appointing 
officials that were not the chosen representatives of the sailors. 
Since 1918 the BoslsheviKs had been slowly enforcing their will uoon the 
;ailor's who, in 1917, had virtual!)' declared their independence fr'om 
Russia. With some mumbl ing, RasKolniKov was acceoted, if for no other 
reason than as a necessary consequence of the civil war, which was still 
being waged at the time. 
Upon aopointment, RasKolniKov replaced two-thirds of the commanding 
officers and party leaders with his chosen favorites, from the days he 
• 
served in the Caspian Sea. The reolacements introduced an element of 
ethnic unrest as most of these new replacements were of Eastern origin. 
s
 
• To maKe matters worse, RasKolniKov implemented changes in the form of privilege. Thus RasKolniKov and his officers got the best rations, the 
best housing, the best clothing and enjoyed various social privileges, 
all above arid beyond what theY really needed. They flaunted it too at 
the expense of others. In December 1920, food shortages finally hit 
Kronstadt but RasKolniKov and his favorites were never short of fuel or 
food. The ire of the sailors was tremendous, reminding the few veterans 
of 1917 of the late Admiral Viren under the Tsar. Other measures were 
also r·eminiscent of Adm. Viren: the overtly harsh discipl ine, the 
restricted freedom of movement, the prohibition to gather or organize 
and the weak effort to isolate the s.ai lors from unofficial propaganda. 
RasKolnikov used the Tcheka to root out undesirable SR's, Mensheviks, 
~nd anyone else that the Bolsheviks did not approve of. This pol icy of 
• pol itical intolerance ran smack into sailor expechtions. Part of the program developed among the revolutionaries in 1917 was an open system 
of multiparty government in the soviet. The Bolsheviks charged those 
arrested with counter-revolutionary sympathies if not outright 
conspiracy. The sailors were not sYmpathetic to 
counter-revolutionaries, but the parties of the left were never 
counter-revolutionary in the sailors' eyes. (Getzler 210-212) 
Not on!>' did Raskolnikov al ienate the sai lors but he got into 
trouble wi th Petrograd. As part of his pol icy to restructure the Bal tic 
Fleet, he sought to bring the Petrograd naval base under his authority. 
Gregori Zinoviev, who was the BolsheviK party boss in Petrograd, would 
have nothing of it. Trotsky and Zinoviev were fierce rivals at the time 
• 
and RasKolnikov was Trotsky's man. Kronstadt then became a victim of 
that confl ict. Zinoviev did not want anything to do wi th RaskolniKov. 
6 
• As a resul t of this confl iet, Raskolnikov's eHorts to reconstruct the integrity of the Baltic Fleet failed by the end of January 1921. 
(Getzler 211-212) 
The discontent among the sailors was driven by more than just 
shortages and Raskolnikov. Just as in 1917, the soldiers and sailors 
were unusually concer'ned wi th the I ives of the oeas!lnts. When on leave, 
the men would return to their homes to see and hear the latest news. 
They got to see Lenin's War Communism in action. Forced grain 
collections and illegal requisitioning were ramoant throughout the 
countryside. Lenin knew what was going on but for the most Dart was 
unable to do much about it. Those who were caught by the Communist 
Pa.rty l~ere severely punished. (Lenin, 41) Nevertheless, the soldiers 
and sailors only knew what theY saw. The state of affairs in the 
• countryside was oretty well known to the Kronstadters and this affected their la.ter actions. As a resul t. the decl ine in Communist oart." 
membership accelerated. In March of 1920 mebership was around 5,630, b." 
December 1920 membershio fell to 2.228. Membershio to the party 
continued to fall as the crisis deepened. (Getzler 208-212) 
Around mid-Februar." Raskolnikov left Kronstadt and party control of 
Kronstadt soon collaosed. The administrative structure for the city and 
fleet collapsed entirely, leaving a power vacuum to be filled by the 
sai lors. Whi Ie in thi·s state of I imbo and uncer·taint.", events in 
Petrograd began to heat up. Strikes in several large factories erupted. 
The workers were demanding provisions and fuel. It should be noted that 
Communist part." members and other important officials were adequately 
• 
suppl ied during the shortages, in eHect privi lege was the i·ssue. Due 
to the harsh winter, Petrograd and much of the north was virtuall." 
7 
• isolated from the rest of the country. The demands of the workers, however, fell on deaf ears. Zinoviev and other officials ordered the 
workers back to work. Units of the Kursanti (officer cadets) and Tcheka 
were used to break up meetings and protests. The Party officials 
declared the strikes as part of a counter-revolutionary plot by 
Mensheviks and SRs. Petrograd became a garrisoned city virtually 
overnight. (Avrich Kronstadt, 45-47) 
Due to Kronstadt's isolation, news of the strikes did not reach the 
island untj I February 26, 1921. The sai lors wer·e qui te concerned. The 
sailors of the battleships Sevastopol and Petropavlovsk met and elected 
a fact-finding delegation of 32 men, one of which was the sailor 
Petrichenko, to go to Petrograd and get the story. Upon arrival, 
February 27, theY found a ci ty in turmoi I and in a state of fr.ightened
• calm. During the day several more factories suspended ooerations. The government ordered them back to work wi th little effect. Zinoviev who 
• 
had organized a Committee for Defense to deal with the situation a 
couole days earl ier, declared Martial Law in the ci ty and lock-outs were 
implemented in several fa.ctories. The lock-outs had the effect of 
denying the workers all rations, hence condemning them to starvation. 
(Berkman Bolshevik, 291-292) The delegates had difficulty getting anyone 
to talk because many of the workers feared the local party workers and 
Tchekist agents. The Mensheviks, under the direction of Fiodor Dan, did 
take advantage of the crisis to spread leaflets condemning the Bolshevik 
dictator·shio and demanding free election of so.,iets for all pol itical 
parties. iGetzler, 212-213) During the crisis thousands of Mensheviks 
and SRs were arrested and imprisoned nationwide by the Tcheka. (Avrich 
Kronstadt, 47-48) 
• As a side note, very few anarchists had their freedam in February 1921. Most were in jail, in the Ukraine or dead. Alexander Berkman and 
Emma Goldman, two deported Russian-American anarchists were in Petrograd 
at the time of the uprising. Other notable anarchists such as Vol ine, 
Aaron Baron, Maksimov, Karel in and the Gordon brothers were in prison 
for their pol i tical posi tions. The pi ight of the Russian a.narchists 
received much sympathy from anarchists abroad. Though most of the 
leader; of the anarchists were in jail, there were thousands of people 
who were sympathetic to the anarchist cause or who worked with it. 
Perepelkin has been regarded as an anarchist and Petrichenko has been 
con;idered sympathetic. (Avr'ich Kronstadt, 167-170) Similar problems 
can be seen with the SRs of both the left and right. Though the SR's 
were not anarchists. the two followings held similer views on many
• issue;, especially the agricultural issue. The SR-~1axims.1 ists, a faction of the SRs, seemed to lean toward the anarchists in their 
outlook than the regular SRs. Many SR-Maximal ists still resided on 
Kronstadt, most notabl>' Anatoll ia Lamenov. The only real difference 
between the SR-Maximal ists and the anarcrlists lay' in the degree of party 
organization and the usefulness of indiscriminant violence. Back in 
1~'17 the 11aximal ist faction had or,]y existed as part of the Non-Party 
group along with anarchists, though a Maximal ist faction of the SRs 
existed long before 1917. 
February 28th, the delegation returned to the battleships where a 
general meeting of the crews was held, Stephan Petrichenko and Piotr 
Perepelkin presiding. The findings of the delegation were read. The 
• 
Communist leaders of Kronstadt were in attendence, Pavel Vasil iev and 
Andrian Zosimov. These two men both tried in vain to block the events 
• that were to occur. A resolution was drawn up expressing the concerns and demands of the sailors, a vote was taken and the resolution was 
adopted by the sailors. Vasiliev, Zosimov, and the Commisar of the 
Baltic Fleet, N. Kuzmin were furious. The Corr~unists called a general 
gathering of all Kronstadters in Anchor Square for the next day. 
(Getzler 212-213) Meanwhile in Petrograd the unrest was beginning to 
take on a pol,itical tone. A proclam.ation was posted, in Petrograd, in 
the afternoon condemning the Bolsheviks and demanding free elections, 
freedoms of speech and press, freedom of assembly, and the I iberation of 
arrested political prisoners. (Berkman Bolshevik, 2$'2) 
March 1st, in Kronstadt a massive gathering of 15-16,000 soldiers, 
sailors and workers gathered in Anchor Square. Mikhail Kal inin, 
Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, 
• arrived to look the situation over and speak to the people gathered. Kal inin was greeted with mil itary honors. Accompanying him was Pavel 
Vasil iev and Nikolai Kuzmin. The mood of the crowd was extremely 
hostile but subdued. Apparently Kal inin noticed the mood of the crowd, 
and suggested that the meeting be moved indoors to the Naval Manage 
where the crowd would be smaller. The crowd quickly refused demanding 
that if something important needed to be stated then it could be spoken 
in the square. The various accounts of this gathering are mixed but 
clearly the sailors were in no mood to comoromise and neither was 
Kal inin. After a harsh shouting match between the Communists and the 
peoole gathered, Perepelkin moved to adopt the resolution drawn up the 
previous day. The motion was seconded by Petrichenko and put to a vote 
• 
immediately in front of the Communist officials. The resolution was 
adopted unanimously with Vasil iev, Kuzmin and Kal inin each opposed. 
10 
• Kalinin denounced the ~esolution as counte~-~evolutiona~y and made clea~ that the Soviet Union was not about to let K~onstadt go without a fight. 
The ~esolution adopted is as follows: 
"Resolution of the Gene~al Meeting of the 
1st and 2nd SQuad~ons of the Baltic Fleet, held 
on Mar-ch 1s t, 1921. 
"Afte~ having hea~d the ~epo~ts of the 
delegates sent to Pet~ograd by the gene~al 
meeting of the c~ews to examine the situation, 
the assembly decided that, since it has been 
establ ished that the p~esent Soviets do not 
exp~ess the wi II of the wo~ker"s and peasants, it 
is neocessary: 
1. to p~oceed immediately to the 
~e-election of the Soviets by sec~et ballot, the 
electo~al campaign among wo~ke~s and peasants to 
be ca~~ied on with full f~eedom of speech and 
ac t i on ; 
2. to establ ish f~eedom of soeech and 
p~ess fo~ all wo~ke~s and peasants, fo~ the 
Ana~chists and Left Social ist pa~ties; 
• 3. to accord f~eedom of assembly to the workers~ and peasants' organisations; 4. to convoke, outsi,je of the pol itical pa~ties, a Confe~ence of the wo~ke~s, Red soldie~s and sailo~s of Pet~og~ad, K~onstadt and 
the Pet~og~ad p~ovince fo~ Ma~ch 10th, 1921,_ at 
the latest; 
5. to libe~ate all Socialist political 
p~isone~s and also all wo~ke~s, peasants, Red 
soldiers and sailors, imprisoned as a res-ul t of 
the workers' and peasants' movements; 
6. to elect a commission fo~ the purpose 
of examining the cases of those who a~e in 
prisons or concentration camps; 
7. to abo I ish the 'p 0 lit ica I off ice s' , 
since no pol i tical pa~ty should have p~ivi leges 
fo~ p~opagating its ideas o~ ~eceive money f~om 
the State fo~ this pu~pose, and to ~eplace them 
with educational and cultu~al commissions 
elected in each local i ty and financed bY the 
governmen t; 
8. to abolish immediately all [int~astatel 
ba~~iers [to t~adel; 
9. to make unifo~m the ~ations of all 
wo~ke~s, except fo~ those engaged in occupations 
• 
dange~ous to thei~ health; 
10. to abol ish the Communist shock-t~ooos 
in all units of the a~my and the Communist 
guards in the factories; in case of need, guard 
II 
• detachments could be supplied in the army by the companies and in the factories by the workers; 11. to give the peasants full fr·eedom of action in rega.rd to their land and a.lso the 
right to possess cattle, on condition that they 
do their own work, that is to say, without 
hiring helpi 
12. to establ ish a travel 1ing control 
commission; 
13. to permit the free excercise of 
handicrafts, provided no hired help is used; 
14. we ask all uni to of the army and the 
Kursanti cadets to join our resolution; 
15. we demand that all our resolutions be 
widely pub 1 icised in the press. 
This resolution was adopted unanimously by the 
meeting of the crews of the two Squadrons. Two 
persons abstained. 
Signed: Petrichenko, president of the 
meeting: Perepelkin, socretary.' 
(Vol ine, 473-475) 
• In looKing at clause 2 one wi 11 notice that the freedoms of speech and of the press are only to be given to the various leftist parties. Vol ine suggests that the Kronsladters were, fr·om the very beginning, 
very concerned about the dangers of misunderstanding by outsiders. As 
would be later seen, the BolsheviKs were quicK to accuse Kronstadt of 
being guided by reactionarY elements. The fact that the resolution only 
called for partial freedoms of speech and the press is, perhaps, a 
reflection of this concern. but this conclusion is uncertain at best. 
(Vol ine. 473) The conference called for was never held nor were 
elections to the Kronstadt Soviet ever held. This was perhaps 
acceptable in I ight of the events that tooK place. 
Back in Petrograd, the TcheKa had arrested large numbers of people. 
The trade unions wer·e being I iquidated but the unrest continued. 
• Zinoviev is reported to have called on Moscow for mil itary reinforcements to support the unrel iable forces in the pr·ovince. 
/2..  
• Extraordinary Martial Law was declared in Petrograd. (BerKman BolsheviK, 21"2-293) At the sa.me time roadblocKs were lifted to permi t freer tr-ade 
which suddenly pr-ovided the town with gener-ous provisions of food and 
clothing. (Getzler-, 221) Other- concessions wer-e being pr-epar-ed. 
Mar-ch 2nd, a Conference of Delegates was held in Kr-onstadt with 
equal r-epresentation for- all inter-ests. Thr-ee-hundred-three delegates 
attended, with PetrichenKo presiding. The business of the meeting 
consisted of establ ishing a tempor-ary Provisional Revolutionar>' 
Committee to manage the 'situation until elections for- the Soviet could 
be held. The Committee was made up of a 5 member- Presidium. to be later 
expanded to 15 members on March 4th. The member-s included: Petr-ichenKo, 
a sailor-; YaKovenKo, who was a telephone operator; Oreshin, who was a 
teacher at the third Technical School, per-haps the only one to be part 
• of the Intell igentsia; TuKin, who was an electr-ician; and Ar-Khipov, who was a mechanic. Wi th the exception of Oreshin, all 15 members of the 
Committee wer-e of Pr-oletar-ian bacKgrounds, (Vol ine, 48B) Kuzmin and 
Vasi I iev were both pr-esent at the Confer-ence and ster-nly war-ned again 
that the Communists were not about to let Kronstadt go without a 
struggle. The Committee tooK them ser-iously and had them promptly 
arrested. Kal inin, who was sti 11 in town, was allowed to r-etur-n to 
Petrograd. The issue of how to deal with the remaining Communists on 
the island was discussed. They wer-e fr-ee to Join the Conference if they 
desired, the others were allowed to leave if they chose. It should be 
noted that lar-ge numbers of Party member-s did defect to the Kr-onstadt 
cause. The publ ication of the Kronstadt newspaper-, Izvestia was also 
• 
establ i shed dur- i ng the Confer-ence. 
/3.  
• Of particular interest is a rumor that got started at the Conference. The rumor claimed that the Communists had trucKloads of 
armed soldiers already on the way to breaK up the meeting. It was only 
a rumor but at the time the delegates tooK it seriously and got whipped 
into a frenzy. A quicK decision was made to seize all important 
facilities of the island and of the var-ious forts around the Gulf. All 
but Krasnaia GorKa and Oranienbaum were seized and not a shot fired. It 
has been ar-gued that the Kronstadters were, in fact, the first to taKe 
offensive military action as a result of the March 2nd decision, not the 
BolsheviKs. The real question should be directed to the origins of the 
rumor. Mystery surrounds it. The rumor seems too conveniently laid and 
it did succeed in further polarizing the situation. Was there perhaps a 
conspiracy to cause trouble? No evidence exists to prove it one way or 
• the other. News of what was happening in Russia was getting out abroad. 
Victor Chernov, the former Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, offered 
to provision Kronstadt with the help of Russian emigres. The SR party 
in Russia 1iKewise offered to aid Kronstadt in any way necessary. The 
Provisional Revolutionary Commi ttee (PRO turned down the offers unti I 
circumstances changed but they would Keep them in mind. (BerKman 
Kronstadt, 16) Alfred Rosmer points out that the foreign press became 
exu I tan t. The ex i I ed em igres and the fore ign press were a II eager to 
join in on the side of Kronstadt without even considering the program 
that the sai lors had to offer. To the emigres, a_II that matter-ed was 
overthrowing the Bolsheviks. The event was hailed as the Third 
• 
Revolution by anarchists and others abroad. (FranK, 16-17) As such, 
plans were being made to seize the moment once the ice started to melt 
1'1  
• in the Gulf. The BolsheviKs knew very well what the emigres were UP to, but it is not at all cl ear if Kronstadt knew. 
Back in Petrograd, March 2, Kal inin and Zinoviev set about 
isolating the island with the help of loyal Kursanti cadets and the 
Peterhof Battal ion. The strikes were more or less subdued by force and 
by concessions of provisions that were rushed in to alleviate worKer 
demands. In Moscow, Lenin and TrotsKy (Trotsky had been recalled from 
Siberia where he had been suppressing peasant uprisings) issued the 
first official anouncement. The statement declared the disturbance as 
counter-revolutionary and instigated bY the French and White guard 
emigres. The Petropavlovsk Resolution was regarded as being an SR-Black 
Hundred resolution. General Kozlovsky was accused of being in charge of 
the uprising in Kronstadt. (Lenin, 67) An element of truth does exist 
• in the statement issued. The French did Know about the uprising. There was a General Kozlovsky in Kronstadt, who had served under the Tsar. 
His role was, however, rather- passive. He was in charge of the 
artillery and had been assigned to the Baltic Fleet by Trotsky a few 
years back. Upon Commissar Kuzmin's arrest, Kozlovsky was supposed to 
have succeeded him. Yet General Kozlovsky refused the posi tion of 
Commisar. He supposedly strongly recommended that the sailors take the 
offensive immediately and seize Oranienbaum. Oranienbaum was of 
dr-ategic importance for its surprise potential and for the 50,000 poods 
of food that were stored there for the fleet. Kronstadt only had two 
weeks worth of rations on the island at the start of the uprising. 
Never the less, the PRC refused the recommenda t ion. Beyond the in it ial 
• 
advic~, Gen. KozlovsKy served no important role in Kronstadt/s uprising. 
I~ 
• Even so, the Bolsheviks used him and his immediate aides for a very successful though false propaganda campaign. (Vol ine, 485-487) 
March 3rd, Izvestia started publ ishing the newspaper for Kronstadt. 
The editor was Anatoll i Lamanov. He was an SR-Maximal ist and his 
political views 'supported the maxim of 'all pOI.~er to the soviets and not 
to political parties'. It is in the pages of Izvestia that he and 
Perepelkin set about promoting their ideas and publ ishing the workings 
of the PRC. (Getzler, 229-230) Fourteen issues were printed during the 
two week affair and it is from these issues that author's of the various 
secondary works cited got much of their information. The PRC spent the 
day working on getting matters organized on the island itself. 
Elections were held for various positions in the factories and in the 
mil itary. Housing needs were looked into. 
• It is on March 3rd that the propaganda war got fully underway. Berkman does not record anything terribly significant other than that 
word of Kronstadt had finally gotten around to the general population of 
Petrograd. The Bolsheviks were using everything in their power to 
convince the people that the sailors had erred and that they should 
surrender immediately. A long radio message was broadcast from Moscow 
repeating the same condemnation of the sai lors. (Vol ine, 482) The 
unrest in Petrograd had ended, though Berkman impl ies that it was fear 
and uncertainty that kept matters silent. Kronstadt's Izvestia claimed 
that unrest was still gripping Petrograd and expressed hope that the 
workers would rise up in rebell ion. In the meantime, Kal inin and 
Zinoviev were waiting for reinforcements and Trotsky. 
• 
March 4th, the entire Petrograd Province was placed under martial 
la.w. ~10re arrests took place and hostages were taken in I ieu of the 
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• arrests of Kuzmin and Vasil iev. The city's government facil ities were garrisoned by loyal troops. Late that night the Petrograd Soviet met to 
discuss the matter. TrotsKy was supposed to be there but his train was 
delayed by weather. The Soviet was pacKed with Communists but others 
were pres.ent. Zinoviev presided wi th Kal inin pr·esent. The debate 
appears to have been dominated by the Communists. What exactly went on 
during the meeting is disputed but one important conclusion can be 
drawn: the local Communists were not unified in their feel ings toward 
Kronstadt. Robert Daniels claims that Kal inin felt the sailor's 
grievances were legitimate and their solutions even acceptable. He goes 
on to suggest that the Petrograd Soviet as a whole was in disagreement 
with Moscrn. on how to resolve the crisis. Moscow's decision to forcedly 
suppress Kronstadt was based on exaggerated descriptions of the events 
• by Zinoviev. (Daniels, 245) Nevertheless, the Soviet did condemn the uprising as a counter-revolutionary plot and demanded that Kronstadt 
surrender immediately or else. 
Kronstadt repl ied that it did not want to s.hed blood, that they 
bel ieved in soviet style government and that ther·e was no conspiracy 
afoot. The PRC declared that Kronstadt would defend itself if attacKed 
and thus dec ided to arm the c iv iii ans and prepare for the defense of the 
island. Elections were announced for various administrative positions 
in the trade unions and in the Council of Unions. The Council of Unions 
was to represent the worKers and would Keep in contact with the PRC. 
(Vol ine, 494, 504) 
March 5th, TrotsKy arrived and issued an ul timatum to Kronstadt 
• 
demanding unconditional surrender or else suffer suporession by force of 
arms. (Lenin, 67) BerKman felt that many Communists, whom he was on 
17 
• good t~rms with, disb~l i~ved that force would be used. Sergei Kamenev and MiKhail TuKhachevsKy arriv~d with TrotsKy and were assigned their 
roles as Commanders-in-Chi~f, TuKhachevsKy being the senior partner. 
80th were former Tsarist gen~rals. Kronstadt repeatedly pointed this 
fact out as a retort to the KozlovsKy accusations. Efforts to pr~pare 
for battle were begun imm~diat~ly. Alexander BerKman, Emma Goldman and 
two Russian anarchists, P~rKus and PetrovsKy, jointly offered a proposal 
to Zinoviev to cr~at~ a special commission to mediate th~ crisis. 
Zinovi~,' acc~pted th~ proposal but nothing ev~r cam~ of i t. (B~rKm.an 
BolsheviK, 310-302) 
March 6th, battle preparations w~re finished. Kronstadt issued an 
app~al to the citiz~ns of P~trograd. Th~y declared their cause was just 
and called for delegates to be sent to find out th~ truth. BerKman says 
• I ittle more. Apoar~ntly the world was waiting for a show-down. March 7th to March 17th, the BolsheviKs laid seig~ to Kronstadt and 
the various little forts scatt~r~d in th~ Gulf. Th~ seige w·as a ,'irtual 
war of attrition. From a strat~gic standpoint the sailors had the 
advantage of firepower and position. The BolsheviKs had superiority in 
numbers and supply. Had the Kronstadt~rs wait~d two we~Ks later for the 
r~b~ll ion, they would have had an unfrozen Gulf to their advantag~. As 
it was, th~ BolsheviKs had to attacK over open ice. Of the 50.000 
troops commi tted, 80/: lost their I iv~s. The Kronstadters defond~d 
th~mselves with only 15,000 men scatt~red over a wide front. Many of 
th~ troops the BolsheviKs sent in were Kursanti and Tch~Ka ag~nts. Th~ 
r~gular R~d Army was deem~d undependable. Only the most loyal troops 
• 
were committed. Ev~n so, TrotsKy and TuKhachevsKy tooK no chances and 
had th~ soldiers bacKed up with machine guns to pr~vent d~s~rtion. 
1'1  
• March 16th the BolsheviKs entered the city and tooK Kronstadt by the next day. Approximately 8000 refugees escaped to Finland, including 
PetrichenKo. What followed is largely unrecorded or unKown but 
supposedly many people were executed, jailed or at the very least 
relocated to other regions in the country, (Getzler, 243) Such was the 
end to the crisis. BerKman records an irony that on the 18th the 
BolsheviKs celebrated the anniversary of the Paris Commune. TrotsKy and 
Zinoviev denounced those that suppresed the Commune with great 
slaughter. (BerKman Bolshevik, 303) 
Meanwhile, on March 8th to March 16th, the Tenth Party Congress was 
held. Kronstadt and the dire situation throughout Russia were the 
prominent issues debated. Lenin addressed the Congress several times. 
He made great play of the White Guards and counter-revolution but he did 
• concede on the 8th that the sailors only wanted to reform the regime with free trade and a slight shift in soviet power. He made clear that 
regardless of their intentions, Kronstadt was playing into the hands of 
White Guard counter-revolutionaries. Lenin never did refute in any way 
the official I ine. On the 15th, Lenin admitted that Kronstadt wanted 
neither White Guards nor the state power of the Bolsheviks. An element 
of truth exists in Lenin's claims as will be later examined. Wetzler, 
220) During the Congress, Lenin brought forth the program that was to 
be later called the NEP (New Economic Pol icy). The actual program had 
had been voted on in the Central Commi ttee of the BolsheviK Party bacK 
in Februar'y 24, 1921. It is ironic that the program ratified by the 
Tenth Party Congress granted many of the economic demands that were made 
• 
by Kronstadt, notably free trade and the end of forced requisitions. 
(FranK, 14) Myster,Y surrounds why the Bolsheviks did not just tell the 
/9 
• sailors that thoy had gotton what thoy wantod or, bottor yot, had informod tho publ ic bacK in Fobruary to avoid tho crisis all togothor. 
Tho BolshoviKs claimod that a conspiracy was undorfoot in 
Kronstadt. If so, what was it? Evidonco of a conspiracy would 
dofinitoly idontify tho truo naturo and purposo of tho robollion. 
Robort 'J. Daniols, in a vory intor-osting analysis of tho roboll ion, 
offors sovoral points of ovidonco that claim no plot was afoot among tho 
Kronstadtors. (Daniols, 241-245) Tho first point is tho mattor of 
timing. Had tho sailors waitod anothor two wooKs, tho ico would havo 
boon broKon up, maKing tho island virtually imprognablo and onabl ing 
rosupply. Daniols claims that any conspiracy would havo waitod for 
bottor timing. Tho writor of this papor, is willing to suggost that 
this is not proof against conspiracy. Tho disoaso of mutiny, onco it 
• gots looso, tonds to run wild. Had thoy waitod two wooKs, TchoKa agonts may havo gotton suspicious and may havo activoly worKod to purgo tho 
possiblo mutinoors. Tho timing also may havo boon right. Tho noods of 
any roboll ionaro that thoro oxists a dofini tivo potential support baso. 
Tho striKos in Potrograd providod an opportunity to win support. In 
fact during tho whole crisis Kronstadt consistontly appoalod to tho 
pooplo of Potrograd for thoir activo support which novor manifostod. 
Tho sympathy of a city doos not win battlos activo participation 
doos. A conspiracy could not havo dopondod on possiblo unrost in two 
moro wooKs.. Furthormoro, just 1iKo Kr·on·stadt, Potrograd too, could havo 
boon rol iovod wi th outsido provisioning thoroby satisfying workor 
domands. Tho BolshoviKs had alroady docidod upon tho NEP as a solution. 
• 
Socond, Daniols points out that Kronstadt failod to taKo tho 
offonsivo as advisod bY Gonoral KozlovsKy. Again tho writor of this 
• paper does not see how this disproves a conspiracy. A decision was made, nothing more. Certainly if the sailors had taKen the offensive, 
events would have been very different and probably in the sailors favor. 
But taKing the offensive would only have convinced the BolsheviKs and 
the peoole of Petrograd that there really was a White Guard conspiracy. 
Hence risKing the support potential of Petrogr·ad for the rebel I ion. By 
staying out, the sailors won some points in the image game and looKed 
convincingly more I iKe r·eformers than rebels. They also bought time to 
worK out a peaceful negotiation if possible. 
Third, Daniels points out that no evidence exists to suggest that 
the Communists in Kronstadt suspected a conspiracy before or after the 
revolt had begun. This point is more convincing than the previous two. 
The issue becomes one of the completeness of evidence. One oossible 
• relevent consideration is that on March 17th, many of the Communists that had been left free by the sailors in Kronstadt took up arms and 
betr·ayed the other sai lor·s by fighting a.longside the BolsheviKs. 
(Vol ine, 532) Perhaps the Kronstadt Communists, who were in the 
minority throughout the crisis, were just buying time by appeasing the 
PRC. 
Fourth, Daniels bel ieves that the release of Kal inin was a gesture 
of good will. Kal inin would have made an excellent hostage. What good 
ar·e ho·;tages? The BolsheviKs tooK several and the Dol icies of the PRC 
did not change. How would Kal inin's arrest have changed the BolsheviK 
position? Why would a conspiracy bother taKing Kal inin hostage? The 
sailors held no grudge against him personally, unl iKe Kuzmin and 
• 
V·asil iev. Again this writer is not convinced that a H,ere was not a 
conspiracy. At the same time this wr·iter feels there is no definitive 
AI  
• proof of a conspiracy by the sailors. Furthermore, BolsheviK claims to the eHect seem to be 1 i ttle more tr,an empb' propaganda. The question 
is unresolved. (Daniels, 246-247) 
Where a conspiracy among the sailors seems unresolved, conspiracy 
by outside parties does appear evident and was Known to the BolsheviKs 
to some degree. The BolsheviKs Knew that if they did not provision 
Kronstadt then sailors would have np recourse but to receive provisions 
from abroad. The offers made by Lev Chernov and the SRs were known to 
the BolsheviKs as was the PRC's response. The PRC did not totally 
refu·se out of hand, but rather put the issue oH for latH. Kronstadt 
was strategical II' useful for anyone desiring to resume the civil war. A 
memorandum reproduced by Pierre FranK reveals that the emigres knew in 
advance of the potential for rebel I ion and .,ere maKing contingencY plans 
• if it should arise. (FranK, 26-30) Plans were made to involve the French and General Wrangel's forces. Yet no provision was made for the 
interests of the sailors. The emigres merely assumed that theY 
themselves would go in and displace the PRC. The BolsheviKs may have 
feared just this: that regardless of Kronstadt's true motives the Whi te 
Armies would seize the island for their own purposes. Therefore, 
suppressing the rebel 1ion before the ice thawed was impHative. (FranK, 
24-32) !tshould be noted that once the rebel 1ion began all the enemies 
of the BolsheviKs, foreign and domestic, hastened to join the sailors: 
Left and Right SRs, MensheviKs and anarchists. (Fr·anK, 16) 
The importance of the conspiracy issue is that it would clearly 
identify the nature of the rebel I ion. The BolsheviKs and BolsheviK 
• 
apologists all appeal to evidence of conspiracy as a means of justifying 
BolsheviK actions. The anarchists conversely point out that no 
• conspiracy existed and that the ensuing battle was unjustified. Furthermore, the anarchists appeal to the sailors' demands as being in 
some way good and the Bolsheviks efforts to suppress them is in some way 
evi I. In a strange way both sides are correct. 
The role and influence of the anarchists in Kronstadt remains 
rather mysterious. As a pol itical group, formal organization was an 
anathema and as such records appear scarce. Apparently, in 1921, no 
known prominent anarchists wor·e in Kronstadt. Though a few anarchists 
were in Petrograd, the only notable ones were Berkman and Goldman. Most 
of the anarchist ringleaders were dead or in jail. Some speculation 
exists that Perepelkin was an anarchist and that Petrichenko was very 
s>'mpathetic to the anarchist cause. The SR-Maximal ists were very close 
ideologically to the anarchist·s in terms of their ideal society. The 
• Maximal ists were rhetorically more in favor of indiscriminant violence to achieve their aims. Kronstadt, in 1921, was not organized along 
party I ines during the uprising, nei ther did the padies figure into the 
pol itical eouation of the PRe. The slogan of the Kronstadters was 'Free 
Soviets. wi thout parties'. The communists, in general, were allowed 
their freedom and were the only organized pol i tical par·ty at the time. 
There were numerous SR-Maximal ists but an SR-Maximal ist party never 
arose. Kronstadt was against the possibil ity of any party dominating so 
by de fault no parties emerged. 
The absence of prominent anarchists does not preclude anarchist 
influence. Kronstadt had a tradition for being .n .narchist stronghold 
ba.ck in 1917 with such impodant figures as Efim Yar·chuk and I.S. 
• 
Bleichman. Much of the program adopted, by Kronstadt, in 1917 had 
anarchist overtones much to the chagrin of the Bolsheviks. Most notable 
• wa-s the insistence of the K~onstadt soviet not to submit to the autho~ity of the Pet~og~ad Soviet and afte~ the Octobe~ coup to the 
Bolsheviks. Ove~ the cou~se of the civi I wa~ K~onstadt had been d~ained 
of much of its ~evolutiona~y st~ength as units left to fight the Whites 
but the spi~it neve~ died. In 1921 the sailo~s looked back and saw what 
had been and knew what had been D~omised. Such slogans as 'all p~~e~ to 
the soviets' ~emained imp~essed upon thei~ minds as the vete~ans passed 
on the sailo~ t~adition to new ~ec~uits. The p~og~am and demands of 
1921, embodied in the Pet~opavlovsk Resolution, again had st~ong 
anarchist overtonps. 
The p~og~am adopted by the sailo~s of K~onstadt in 1921 ~eflected 
the natu~e of sailors. The p~ogram st~ongly ~esembled the p~og~am of 
1917. To unde~stand the prog~am is to unde~stand the characte~ of the 
• 5ailors themselves. The K~onstadt sailo~s have displayed consistent cha~acteristics over the yea~s. They ~esented privilege and authority. 
The sailo~s dis! iked ~egimentation, but they did know how to get matte~s 
taken ca~e of when necessary. The sailo~s th~oughout the years sha~ed 
d~eams of local autonomy and self-administ~ation. These characteristics 
manifested themselves into extreme hosti 1i ty towa~ds central government 
and appointed officials. Their dreams called fo~ direct democracy in 
local soviets r-esembl ing the the Russian medieval veche. K~onstadt was 
the last of a series of ~ebellions against autho~ity, all of which we~e 
spontaneous and violent. (Av~ich K~onstadt, 64-65) 
In looking at the Pet~opavlovsk Resolution ~ep~oduced above, one 
can examine the demands of the sailo~s. The 1ist comp~ises both 
• 
economic and pol itical demands. The economic demands do not seem to 
have antagonized the Bolsheviks much, as many of them we~e soon to be 
• implemented anyway as part of what would be called the New Economic Pol icy. What did infuriate the Bolsheviks was the impl ied demand for 
the Bolsheviks to give up their monopoly on pol itica! power. Free 
elections to the soviets implied there was a chance that the Corr~unists 
woul d fai I to wi n the elect ions. Kronstadt ne i ther wan ted to abol ish 
the soviet system nor to call bacK the Consti tuent Assemb!>'. Local 
government and direct democracy was an anarchic concept as long as any 
authority was subject immediately to the people. 
The PRC for the most part I ived up to its demands. Food rationing 
was equalized with exceptions going to children and the ill. All 
positions of authority were subject to election and immediate recall. 
Pol i tio.l departments wer'e abol ished leaving no party any unfair 
adv.ntage, namely the Communists. (Avrich Kron'stadt, 157-159) In the 
• factories the concept of 'workers control' was emphasized and implemented. Agricultural questions for Kronstadt were not directly 
relevant as the island had no significant agricultural production. 
Trade unions were freed from state control. Kronstadt was thoroughly 
.gainst 'state control of any sort. (Avrich Kronstadt, 163-166) 
Anarchism is strongly averse to the idea of the state, of 
organization that breeds authority and party organizations. The Russian 
anarchists proved amenable to a soviet style government <similar to New 
England town councils) so long as it served local interests and did not 
concentrate power into any group. As such, Kronstadt disavowed parties 
and desired freely elected soviets. Equa.1 i ty was another important 
facet of the anarchist cause. Their particular view sought to maximize 
• 
personal freedom as the>' saw it. Equi table housing, rations and the 
abed i shment of property were all impor-tant and ,.ere part of the 
• Kronstadt program, both 1917 and 1921. Freedoms of speech and press were not quite as perfect. Kronstadt only wanted these freedoms 
extended to those on the left. The middle class and gentry were out of 
luck unless they· foreswore their posi tions. In the mi I i tary, the 
sailors elected their corr~anders. Any position of authority was subject 
to election by those whom the position would command. Relations with 
other soviets were to be on an equal footing. This was true in 1917 and 
it was true in 1921. Demands made by others outside of Kronstadt were 
subject to approval by the soviet. Some of these various views were 
shared by the othor pol itical groups of the left but no par·ty proclaimed 
to hold all of them. A strong anarchist influence did exist in 
Kronstadt but Kronstadt was not wholly anarchist. 
Kronstadt was the nadir· of a deep crisis in the 1 ife of the Soviet 
• Union of the Bolsheviks. Who are the vi Ilains and who are the saints? Paul Avrich in Kronstadt 1921 identifies the situation best when he 
writes; "Kronstadt presents a situation in which the historian can 
sympathize with rebels and still concede that the Bolsheviks were 
justified in subduing them. To recognize this, is to grasp the full 
tragedy of Kronstadt." (Avr ich, Kronstadt, 6) Li kewi se it is easy to 
feel sympathetic to the anarchists who have done much of the writing of 
the Kronstadt tragedy. The anarchists saw Kronstadt as their last hope 
for the 'Third Revolution' in Russia. Kronstadt had all of the 
subjective illusions and.ll of the eternal trigger words. The 
anarchists felt that the Bolsheviks had betrayed the revolution and had 
become exactly what they sought to crush, the counter-revolution. 
• 
Berkman writes about an exchange between him and a soldier friend that 
had been wounded in the suppression of rebel I ion. The soldier recalled 
2.6 
• the horrors of the battle that include,j whole battal i'Jns disappearing in the broken ice and the enormous losses of I ife. At the end of his 
account, he is quoted as saying, "In Kronstadt I learned the truth. It 
is we [the Bolsheviks] who were the counter-revolutionaries." <Berkman 
Bolshevik, 306) 
The whole country was in turmoil with various other "Kronstadt" 
uprisings occurring allover. What made Kronstadt unique was its island 
fortr'es;;, the sailors, and the n•. ture of their program. The sailor's had 
been held in high esteem as 'the pride and JOY of the Revolution.' 
Their revolutionary fervor in 1$'17 was unmatched. The Kronstadt 
rebel I ion appears not to have been a counter-revolutionary ploy, but the 
danger of the rebel I ion ;;erving counter-revolutionary purposes did 
exist. The anarchists claim that the Bolsheviks were wrong in putting 
• down the rebell ion as they appealed to the sai lor's aims. In this regard one can s:impathize wi th the anarchists and sai lor·~. However, a case can 
be made that suggests the Bolsheviks were correct in suppressing the 
rebellion, if for no other reason than the danger it represented that 
was beyond the control of the sailors themselves. On another level one 
can see Kronstadt in the I ight of an ideological confl ict between 
Marxism and Popul ism. Lenin bel ieved in what he strove for. No other 
options could rightly exist in Lenin's mind. The Dictatorship of the 
Proletariet was to Lenin the only way to achieve true social ism. The 
anarchists equally bel ieved in their cause. No real compromise existed 
for the two. Kronstadt was the last battle between the two 
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